1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
115 #include "cryptlib.h"
116 #include <openssl/bn.h>
117 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include <openssl/fips.h>
125 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
126 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
127 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
128 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
129 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
130 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
131 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
132 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
133 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
134 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
135 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
136 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
137 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
138 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
139 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
140 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
141 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
143 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
146 RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
150 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
153 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
155 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
158 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
159 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
162 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
163 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
167 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
169 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
173 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
174 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
176 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
181 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
183 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
187 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
189 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
193 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
194 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
196 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
198 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
203 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
206 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
207 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
208 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
209 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
211 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
217 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
218 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
221 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
222 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
225 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
226 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
229 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
232 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
235 if (i <= 0) goto err;
237 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
239 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
241 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
242 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
246 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
247 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
250 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
251 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
253 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
254 * length of the modulus */
256 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
257 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
269 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
275 static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
278 int got_write_lock = 0;
281 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
283 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
285 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
286 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
289 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
290 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
297 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
298 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
300 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
306 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
308 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
309 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
310 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
311 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
314 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
318 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
319 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
323 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
324 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
326 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
331 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
333 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
337 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
341 /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
343 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
346 /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
347 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
349 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
350 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
351 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
356 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
359 /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
360 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
361 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
362 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
363 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
364 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
366 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
370 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
371 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
373 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
374 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
375 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
377 int local_blinding = 0;
378 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
379 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
380 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
381 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
382 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
385 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
387 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
391 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
392 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
394 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
399 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
402 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
403 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
404 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
405 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
407 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
413 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
414 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
416 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
417 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
420 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
422 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
424 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
427 if (i <= 0) goto err;
429 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
431 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
433 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
434 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
438 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
440 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
441 if (blinding == NULL)
443 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 if (blinding != NULL)
450 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
452 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
455 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
459 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
462 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
463 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
464 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
466 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
473 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
477 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
482 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
483 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
486 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
487 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
491 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
494 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
496 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
505 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
506 * length of the modulus */
508 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
509 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
521 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
527 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
528 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
533 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
535 int local_blinding = 0;
536 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
537 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
538 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
539 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
540 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
543 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
545 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
549 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
550 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
552 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
557 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
560 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
561 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
562 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
563 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
565 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
569 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
570 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
573 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
577 /* make data into a big number */
578 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
580 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
582 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
586 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
588 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
589 if (blinding == NULL)
591 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
596 if (blinding != NULL)
598 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
600 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
603 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
608 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
611 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
612 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
613 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
615 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
622 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
625 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
630 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
631 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
633 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
639 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
643 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
647 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
648 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
651 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
652 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
655 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
656 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
659 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
662 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
666 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
676 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
682 /* signature verification */
683 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
684 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
689 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
693 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
695 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
699 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
700 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
702 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
707 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
709 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
713 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
715 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
719 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
720 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
722 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
724 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
729 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
732 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
733 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
734 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
735 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
737 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
741 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
742 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
745 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
749 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
751 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
753 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
757 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
758 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
761 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
762 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
764 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
765 if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
772 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
773 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
775 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
776 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
779 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
782 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
786 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
796 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
802 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
804 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
805 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
806 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
810 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
811 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
812 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
815 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
816 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
818 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
819 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
821 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
825 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
829 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
837 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
839 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
841 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
846 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
847 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
850 /* compute I mod q */
851 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
854 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
855 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
859 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
862 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
863 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
866 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
870 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
871 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
873 /* compute I mod p */
874 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
877 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
878 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
882 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
885 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
886 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
889 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
893 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
894 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
896 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
897 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
898 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
899 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
900 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
902 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
904 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
905 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
908 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
912 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
914 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
915 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
916 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
917 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
918 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
919 * they ensure p > q [steve]
921 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
922 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
923 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
924 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
926 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
928 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
929 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
930 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
931 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
932 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
933 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
934 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
935 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
936 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
937 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
939 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
940 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
941 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
946 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
949 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
953 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
954 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
963 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
966 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
968 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_INIT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
972 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
976 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
978 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
979 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
980 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
981 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
982 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
983 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);