2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
21 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
24 #ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
25 # include <sys/types.h>
27 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
28 # include <sys/stat.h>
31 * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
32 * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
33 * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
34 * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
35 * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
37 # if !defined(S_ISBLK)
38 # if defined(_S_IFBLK)
39 # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK)
40 # elif defined(S_IFBLK)
41 # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK)
42 # elif defined(_WIN32)
43 # define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */
46 # if !defined(S_ISCHR)
47 # if defined(_S_IFCHR)
48 # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR)
49 # elif defined(S_IFCHR)
50 # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR)
59 # define fdopen _fdopen
64 #define RAND_DATA 1024
66 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
68 * Misc hacks needed for specific cases.
70 * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
71 * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that
72 * stdio function return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
73 * Additionally, we create a similar char pointer type for the sake of
76 # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
77 # pragma pointer_size save
78 # pragma pointer_size 32
80 typedef char *char_ptr32;
81 # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
82 # pragma pointer_size restore
86 * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
87 * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
88 * Since we know that the FILE* really is a 32-bit pointer expanded to
89 * 64 bits, we also know it's safe to convert it back to a 32-bit pointer.
90 * As for the buffer parameter, we only use NULL here, so that passes as
93 static void vms_setbuf(FILE *fp, char *buf)
95 setbuf((__FILE_ptr32)fp, (char_ptr32)buf);
98 * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
99 * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
101 static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
102 (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
103 # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
109 * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
110 * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c
113 int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
116 * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
117 * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
120 unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
132 * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
133 * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
134 * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
135 * applications such as Valgrind.
137 memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
138 if (stat(file, &sb) < 0)
140 RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0);
145 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
146 in = vms_fopen(file, "rb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
148 in = fopen(file, "rb");
152 #if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
153 if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
155 * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of
156 * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O
157 * because we will waste system entropy.
159 bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
161 /* don't do buffered reads */
162 # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
163 vms_setbuf(in, NULL);
171 n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE;
174 i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
178 RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
187 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
192 int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
194 unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
195 int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0;
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
203 # if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
204 if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
206 * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we
207 * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random
208 * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device
217 #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
223 * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
224 * should be restrictive from the start
226 int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
228 out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
232 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
234 * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
235 * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
236 * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
237 * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
238 * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
239 * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
240 * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
241 * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
242 * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
243 * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
244 * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
245 * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
246 * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
247 * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
248 * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
251 out = vms_fopen(file, "rb+", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
253 out = vms_fopen(file, "wb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
256 out = fopen(file, "wb");
261 #if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
266 i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n;
268 if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0)
270 i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out);
281 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
283 return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
286 const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
293 if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
294 s = getenv("RANDFILE");
295 if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) {
296 if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
299 if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
306 if (s && *s && strlen(s) + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) {
307 OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size);
308 #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
309 OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "/", size);
311 OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size);
313 buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
318 * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a
319 * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom
320 * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random
321 * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't
326 if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
329 if (stat(buf, &sb) == -1)
330 if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {