1 /* crypto/rand/randfile.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
65 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
66 #include <openssl/rand.h>
67 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
69 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
72 #ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
73 # include <sys/types.h>
75 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
76 # include <sys/stat.h>
79 * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
80 * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
81 * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
82 * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
83 * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
85 # if !defined(S_ISBLK)
86 # if defined(_S_IFBLK)
87 # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK)
88 # elif defined(S_IFBLK)
89 # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK)
90 # elif defined(_WIN32)
91 # define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */
94 # if !defined(S_ISCHR)
95 # if defined(_S_IFCHR)
96 # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR)
97 # elif defined(S_IFCHR)
98 # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR)
105 # define chmod _chmod
107 # define fdopen _fdopen
112 #define RAND_DATA 1024
114 #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)))
116 * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
117 * passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89
119 static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
120 (FILE *(*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
121 # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
124 /* #define RFILE ".rnd" - defined in ../../e_os.h */
127 * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
128 * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c
131 int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
134 * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
135 * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
138 MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
144 * If setvbuf() is to be called, then the FILE pointer
145 * to it must be 32 bit.
148 #if !defined OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER >= 70000000)
149 /* For 64-bit-->32 bit API Support*/
150 #if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
151 #pragma __required_pointer_size __save
152 #pragma __required_pointer_size 32
154 FILE *in; /* setvbuf() requires 32-bit pointers */
155 #if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
156 #pragma __required_pointer_size __restore
160 #endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */
165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
168 * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
169 * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
170 * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
171 * applications such as Valgrind.
173 memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
175 if (stat(file, &sb) < 0)
177 RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0);
182 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
183 in = vms_fopen(file, "rb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
185 in = fopen(file, "rb");
189 #if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
190 if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
192 * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of
193 * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O
194 * because we will waste system entropy.
196 bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
197 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
198 setvbuf(in, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* don't do buffered reads */
199 # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
204 n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE;
207 i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
211 RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
213 /* even if n != i, use the full array */
214 RAND_add(buf, n, (double)i);
224 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
229 int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
231 unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
232 int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0;
235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
240 # if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
241 if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
243 * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we
244 * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random
245 * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device
254 #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
260 * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
261 * should be restrictive from the start
263 int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
265 out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
269 #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)))
271 * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
272 * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
273 * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
274 * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
275 * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
276 * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
277 * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
278 * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
279 * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
280 * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
281 * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
282 * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
283 * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
284 * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
285 * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
288 out = vms_fopen(file, "rb+", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
290 out = vms_fopen(file, "wb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
293 out = fopen(file, "wb");
303 i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n;
305 if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0)
307 i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out);
318 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
320 return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
323 const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
330 if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
331 s = getenv("RANDFILE");
332 if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) {
333 if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
336 if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
343 if (s && *s && strlen(s) + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) {
344 BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size);
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
346 BUF_strlcat(buf, "/", size);
348 BUF_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size);
350 buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
355 * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a
356 * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom
357 * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random
358 * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't
363 if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
366 if (stat(buf, &sb) == -1)
367 if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {