2 * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
12 #include <openssl/err.h>
15 static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
16 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
17 static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
18 static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
19 static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
21 static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
22 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
23 static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x);
24 static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
25 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
28 /* Verify a basic response message */
30 int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
31 X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
34 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
35 STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
36 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
37 int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
40 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
41 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
44 ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
46 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
49 if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
50 flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
51 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
53 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
55 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
58 ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
60 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
64 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
66 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
68 } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
69 untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
70 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
71 if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
72 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
77 untrusted = bs->certs;
79 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
81 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
85 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
86 ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
87 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
89 i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
90 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
91 OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
92 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
93 X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
96 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
101 * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
102 * against the OCSP issuer criteria.
104 ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain);
106 /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
111 * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
114 if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
117 x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
118 if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
119 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
125 X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
126 sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
127 if (bs->certs && certs)
128 sk_X509_free(untrusted);
139 static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
140 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
143 OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
144 if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
148 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
149 (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
153 /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
159 static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
162 unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
165 /* Easy if lookup by name */
166 if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
167 return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
169 /* Lookup by key hash */
171 /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
172 if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
174 keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
175 /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
177 x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
178 X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
179 if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
185 static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
187 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
189 OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
191 sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
193 if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
194 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
198 /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
199 i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
201 /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
205 signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
206 /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
207 if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
208 sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
209 i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
213 /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
214 if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
220 /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
221 return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
225 * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
226 * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
227 * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
228 * equality against one of them.
231 static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
233 OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
236 idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
238 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
239 OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
243 cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
247 for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
248 tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
249 /* Check to see if IDs match */
250 if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
251 /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
252 if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
253 cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
260 /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
265 static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
266 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
268 /* If only one ID to match then do it */
273 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
274 if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
276 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
277 OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
281 mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
284 if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
285 (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
287 iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
288 if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
290 if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
292 X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
293 if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
299 /* We have to match the whole lot */
302 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
303 tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
304 ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
313 static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
315 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
316 && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
318 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
323 * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
324 * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
328 int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
329 X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
335 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
338 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
342 if (!req->optionalSignature) {
343 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
346 gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
347 if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
348 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
349 OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
352 nm = gen->d.directoryName;
353 ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
355 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
356 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
359 if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
360 flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
361 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
363 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
364 ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
366 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
370 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
372 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
373 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
375 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
376 req->optionalSignature->certs);
378 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
382 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
383 X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
384 ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
386 ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
387 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
388 OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
389 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
390 X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
400 X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
405 static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
406 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
410 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
411 signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
418 signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);