2 * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/engine.h>
23 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
24 #include "crypto/bn.h"
26 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
30 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
32 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL);
36 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
38 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx, NULL);
41 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int nid)
43 EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx);
46 ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx, nid);
47 if (ret->group == NULL) {
51 if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
52 && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
60 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
62 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL, nid);
66 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
73 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
74 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
77 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
79 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
82 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
83 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
86 if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
87 r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
90 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
92 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
93 EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
94 EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
95 BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
97 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
100 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
102 if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
103 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
106 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
107 if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
108 dest->meth->finish(dest);
109 if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
110 dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
111 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
112 if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
117 dest->libctx = src->libctx;
118 /* copy the parameters */
119 if (src->group != NULL) {
120 /* clear the old group */
121 EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
122 dest->group = ec_group_new_ex(src->libctx, src->group->meth);
123 if (dest->group == NULL)
125 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
128 /* copy the public key */
129 if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
130 EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
131 dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
132 if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
134 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
137 /* copy the private key */
138 if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
139 if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
140 dest->priv_key = BN_new();
141 if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
144 if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
146 if (src->group->meth->keycopy
147 && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
154 dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
155 dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
156 dest->version = src->version;
157 dest->flags = src->flags;
159 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
160 &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
164 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
165 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
166 if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
168 dest->engine = src->engine;
170 dest->meth = src->meth;
173 if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
181 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
183 EC_KEY *ret = ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key->libctx, ec_key->engine);
188 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
195 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
199 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
202 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
203 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
204 return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
207 ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
209 return eckey->engine;
212 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
214 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
215 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
218 if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
221 ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
227 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
231 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
235 ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
243 * ECC Key generation.
244 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
247 * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
248 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
249 * is stored in this object.
250 * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
251 * fails then the keypair is not generated,
252 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
254 int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
257 BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
258 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
259 EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
260 const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
261 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
266 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
267 priv_key = BN_secure_new();
268 if (priv_key == NULL)
271 priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
274 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
275 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
276 * stated in the security policy.
279 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
284 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
285 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
286 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
287 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
288 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
289 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
292 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key, order, ctx))
294 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
296 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
297 pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
301 pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
303 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
304 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
307 eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
308 eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
316 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
320 OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
323 OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
324 ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg);
327 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
329 BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
330 if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
331 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
334 EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
335 BN_clear_free(priv_key);
340 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
342 return ec_generate_key(NULL, eckey, 0);
345 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
350 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
351 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
353 ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
362 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
364 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
365 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
369 if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
370 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
374 return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
378 * Check the range of the EC public key.
379 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
381 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
382 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
383 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
384 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
386 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
397 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
400 if (EC_GROUP_get_field_type(key->group) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
401 if (BN_is_negative(x)
402 || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
404 || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
408 int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
409 if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
420 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
421 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation.
423 int ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
426 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
427 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
429 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
430 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
434 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
435 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
436 ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
440 point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
444 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
445 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
446 ECerr(0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
450 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
451 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
452 ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
456 order = eckey->group->order;
457 if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
458 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
461 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
462 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
463 ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
466 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
467 ECerr(0, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
472 EC_POINT_free(point);
477 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
478 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
479 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
481 int ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY *eckey)
483 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
484 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
487 if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
488 || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, eckey->group->order) >= 0) {
489 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
496 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
497 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
498 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
500 int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
503 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
506 || eckey->group == NULL
507 || eckey->pub_key == NULL
508 || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
509 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
513 point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
518 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
519 ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
522 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
523 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
528 EC_POINT_free(point);
534 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
535 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
536 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
537 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
539 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
540 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
541 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
543 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
549 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
552 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
555 if (!ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx))
558 if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
559 if (!ec_key_private_check(eckey)
560 || !ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey, ctx))
569 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
574 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
577 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
578 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
579 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
582 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(key->libctx);
587 point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
592 tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
593 ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
597 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
599 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
603 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
604 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
606 if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
607 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
608 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
612 /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
613 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
616 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
624 EC_POINT_free(point);
629 OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *key)
634 const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
639 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
641 if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
643 EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
644 key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
646 return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
649 const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
651 return key->priv_key;
654 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
657 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
658 BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
660 if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
664 * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
665 * fully initialized state.
667 * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
668 * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
669 * as an EC private key.
671 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
672 if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
673 return 0; /* This should never happen */
675 if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
676 && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
678 if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
679 && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
683 * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
684 * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
685 * holding the secret scalar.
687 * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
688 * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
689 * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
690 * the caller specifically set it.
692 * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
693 * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
694 * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
696 * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
697 * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
698 * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
699 * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
701 * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
702 * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
703 * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
704 * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
710 * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
711 * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
712 * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
715 * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
716 * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
717 * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
718 * might temporarily overflow the order length.
720 tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
724 BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
726 fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
727 if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
728 BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
732 BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
733 key->priv_key = tmp_key;
739 const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
744 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
746 if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
747 && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
749 EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
750 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
752 return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
755 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
757 return key->enc_flag;
760 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
762 key->enc_flag = flags;
765 point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
767 return key->conv_form;
770 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
772 key->conv_form = cform;
773 if (key->group != NULL)
774 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
777 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
779 if (key->group != NULL)
780 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
784 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
786 if (key->group == NULL)
788 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
792 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
797 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
803 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
805 key->flags &= ~flags;
809 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
810 unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
812 if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
814 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
817 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
820 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
822 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
823 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
824 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
826 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
830 * Save the point conversion form.
831 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
832 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
833 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
834 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
836 if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
837 key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
841 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
842 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
844 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
846 if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
847 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
851 return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
854 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
855 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
859 buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
860 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
864 else if (len < buf_len)
867 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
869 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
870 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
877 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
881 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
883 if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
884 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
887 ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
893 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
895 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
896 eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
897 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
898 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
901 eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key);
902 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
903 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
910 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
915 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
918 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
919 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
922 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
931 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
933 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
934 || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
940 * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
941 * Perform a sign/verify operation.
943 * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
944 * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
945 * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
948 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
952 unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
953 int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
954 ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
955 OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
957 st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
961 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
962 OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
964 sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
968 OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
970 if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
975 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
976 OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);