2 * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/engine.h>
23 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
24 #include "crypto/bn.h"
26 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
30 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
32 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL);
36 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
38 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx, NULL);
41 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int nid)
43 EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx);
46 ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx, nid);
47 if (ret->group == NULL) {
51 if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
52 && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
60 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
62 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL, nid);
66 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
73 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
74 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
77 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
79 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
82 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
83 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
86 if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
87 r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
90 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
92 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
93 EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
94 EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
95 BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
97 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
100 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
102 if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
103 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
106 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
107 if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
108 dest->meth->finish(dest);
109 if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
110 dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
111 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
112 if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
117 dest->libctx = src->libctx;
118 /* copy the parameters */
119 if (src->group != NULL) {
120 const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
121 /* clear the old group */
122 EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
123 dest->group = EC_GROUP_new_ex(src->libctx, meth);
124 if (dest->group == NULL)
126 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
129 /* copy the public key */
130 if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
131 EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
132 dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
133 if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
135 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
138 /* copy the private key */
139 if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
140 if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
141 dest->priv_key = BN_new();
142 if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
145 if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
147 if (src->group->meth->keycopy
148 && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
155 dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
156 dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
157 dest->version = src->version;
158 dest->flags = src->flags;
160 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
161 &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
165 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
166 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
167 if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
169 dest->engine = src->engine;
171 dest->meth = src->meth;
174 if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
182 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
184 EC_KEY *ret = ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key->libctx, ec_key->engine);
189 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
196 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
200 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
203 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
204 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
205 return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
208 ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
210 return eckey->engine;
213 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
215 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
216 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
219 if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
222 ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
228 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
232 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
236 ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
244 * ECC Key generation.
245 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
248 * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
249 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
250 * is stored in this object.
251 * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
252 * fails then the keypair is not generated,
253 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
255 int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
258 BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
259 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
260 EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
261 const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
262 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
267 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
268 priv_key = BN_secure_new();
269 if (priv_key == NULL)
272 priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
275 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
276 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
277 * stated in the security policy.
280 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
285 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
286 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
287 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
288 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
289 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
290 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
293 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key, order, ctx))
295 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
297 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
298 pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
302 pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
304 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
305 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
308 eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
309 eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
317 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
321 OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
324 OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
325 ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg);
328 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
330 BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
331 if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
332 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
335 EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
336 BN_clear_free(priv_key);
341 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
343 return ec_generate_key(NULL, eckey, 0);
346 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
351 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
352 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
354 ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
363 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
365 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
366 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
370 if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
371 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
375 return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
379 * Check the range of the EC public key.
380 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
382 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
383 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
384 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
385 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
387 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
398 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
401 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
402 if (BN_is_negative(x)
403 || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
405 || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
409 int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
410 if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
421 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
422 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
423 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
424 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
426 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
427 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
428 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
430 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
434 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
435 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
437 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
438 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
442 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
443 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
444 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
448 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
451 if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
454 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
455 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
456 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
460 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
461 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
462 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
466 order = eckey->group->order;
467 if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
468 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
471 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
472 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
473 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
476 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
477 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
481 if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
483 * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
484 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
486 if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
487 || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
488 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
492 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
493 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
495 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
497 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
500 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
501 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
508 EC_POINT_free(point);
512 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
517 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
520 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
521 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
522 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
525 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(key->libctx);
530 point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
535 tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
536 ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
540 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
542 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
546 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
547 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
549 if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
550 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
551 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
555 /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
556 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
559 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
567 EC_POINT_free(point);
572 const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
577 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
579 if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
581 EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
582 key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
584 return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
587 const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
589 return key->priv_key;
592 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
595 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
596 BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
598 if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
602 * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
603 * fully initialized state.
605 * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
606 * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
607 * as an EC private key.
609 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
610 if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
611 return 0; /* This should never happen */
613 if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
614 && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
616 if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
617 && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
621 * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
622 * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
623 * holding the secret scalar.
625 * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
626 * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
627 * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
628 * the called specifically set it.
630 * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
631 * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
632 * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
634 * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
635 * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
636 * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
637 * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
639 * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
640 * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
641 * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
642 * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
648 * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
649 * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
650 * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
653 * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
654 * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
655 * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
656 * might temporarily overflow the order length.
658 tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
662 BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
664 fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
665 if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
666 BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
670 BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
671 key->priv_key = tmp_key;
677 const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
682 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
684 if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
685 && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
687 EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
688 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
690 return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
693 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
695 return key->enc_flag;
698 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
700 key->enc_flag = flags;
703 point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
705 return key->conv_form;
708 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
710 key->conv_form = cform;
711 if (key->group != NULL)
712 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
715 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
717 if (key->group != NULL)
718 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
721 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
723 if (key->group == NULL)
725 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
728 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
733 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
739 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
741 key->flags &= ~flags;
745 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
746 unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
748 if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
750 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
753 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
756 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
758 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
759 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
760 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
762 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
766 * Save the point conversion form.
767 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
768 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
769 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
770 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
772 if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
773 key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
777 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
778 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
780 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
782 if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
783 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
787 return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
790 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
791 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
795 buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
796 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
800 else if (len < buf_len)
803 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
805 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
806 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
813 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
817 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
819 if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
820 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
823 ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
829 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
831 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
832 eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
833 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
834 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
837 eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key);
838 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
839 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
846 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
851 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
854 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
855 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
858 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
867 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
869 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
870 || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
876 * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
877 * Perform a sign/verify operation.
879 * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
880 * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
881 * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
884 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
888 unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
889 int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
890 ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
891 OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
893 st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
897 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
898 OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
900 sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
904 OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
906 if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
911 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
912 OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);