2 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
14 #include "cmp_local.h"
15 #include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
17 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
18 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
19 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
20 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include "crypto/x509.h"
26 * Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
27 * (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
29 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
31 static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
32 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
34 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
35 OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
36 int digest_nid, pk_nid;
37 const EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
38 EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
40 size_t prot_part_der_len = 0;
41 unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
42 BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
45 if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
48 /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
49 if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
50 && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
51 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
55 pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
57 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
61 /* create the DER representation of protected part */
62 prot_part.header = msg->header;
63 prot_part.body = msg->body;
65 len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
66 if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL)
68 prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
70 /* verify signature of protected part */
71 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg->header->protectionAlg->algorithm),
73 || digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
74 || (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
75 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
79 /* check msg->header->protectionAlg is consistent with public key type */
80 if (EVP_PKEY_type(pk_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
81 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
84 if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
86 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, digest, NULL, pubkey)
87 && EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, msg->protection->data,
88 msg->protection->length,
89 prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len) == 1) {
95 res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
96 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
98 ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
102 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
103 OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
104 EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
110 /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
111 static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
112 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret)
114 ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
117 /* generate expected protection for the message */
118 if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, secret, NULL)) == NULL)
119 return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
121 valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
122 && msg->protection->type == protection->type
123 && msg->protection->length == protection->length
124 && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
125 protection->length) == 0;
126 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
128 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
134 * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
135 * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
136 * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
138 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
140 int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
144 X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
147 if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
148 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
152 if (trusted_store == NULL) {
153 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
157 if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL
158 || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
159 cert, ctx->untrusted_certs))
162 valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
164 /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
165 err = ERR_peek_last_error();
166 if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
167 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
170 /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
171 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
172 X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
176 /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
177 static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
178 const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
179 const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
183 if (expect_name == NULL)
184 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
186 /* make sure that a matching name is there */
187 if (actual_name == NULL) {
188 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
191 if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0)
194 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
195 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
197 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
198 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
203 /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
204 static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
205 X509 *cert, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
207 char *actual, *expect;
208 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
211 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
213 /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
215 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
218 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0)
221 if ((actual = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length)) != NULL)
222 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", actual);
223 if ((expect = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
224 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", expect);
225 OPENSSL_free(expect);
226 OPENSSL_free(actual);
230 static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
234 for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
235 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
241 * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
242 * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
243 * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
244 * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
246 * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
248 static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
249 const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
250 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
251 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
252 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
254 X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
255 int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
257 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
260 ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
261 self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
262 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
263 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
266 str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
268 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
272 if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
273 || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
274 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
278 time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
279 X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
281 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
282 : "cert is not yet valid");
287 "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
288 "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
291 if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
293 /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
294 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
298 static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
299 X509 *scrt, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
301 if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
302 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
305 if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
309 "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
314 * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
315 * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
316 * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
317 * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
318 * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
320 static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
321 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
326 if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
329 if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
330 || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
331 1 /* self-issued only */))
334 /* store does not include CRLs */
335 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
338 "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
341 * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
342 * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
344 EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
345 OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
346 ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
348 X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
350 * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
353 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
358 X509_STORE_free(store);
363 * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
364 * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
366 static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
368 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
369 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
370 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
372 int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
373 int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
376 if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
377 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
381 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
382 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
384 if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
386 if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
387 already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
389 n_acceptable_certs++;
390 if (mode_3gpp ? check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg)
391 : check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)) {
392 /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
393 if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
395 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
402 if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
403 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
408 * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
409 * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
411 static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
417 && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
418 || ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
422 mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
423 : "trying first normal mode using trust store");
424 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
425 NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
427 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted_certs, "untrusted certs",
428 msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
431 if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
432 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
433 : "no trusted store");
435 STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
436 ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
437 mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
438 : "certs in trusted store",
439 msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs,
441 sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
446 static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
447 OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
452 /* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
453 static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
455 X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
456 GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
458 char *skid_str = NULL;
459 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
460 OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
463 if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
464 return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
465 if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
466 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
470 /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
471 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
474 * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
475 * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
478 (void)ERR_set_mark();
480 "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
481 if (cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
483 && (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
484 || check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
485 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
488 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
489 /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
490 (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
493 /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
494 (void)ERR_set_mark();
495 ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
496 res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
497 || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
498 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
500 /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
501 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
504 /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
505 (void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
507 sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
508 skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
509 : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
510 if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
511 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
513 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
514 if (skid_str != NULL)
515 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
517 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
518 /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
519 check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
520 check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
523 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
525 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
526 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
528 if (skid_str != NULL) {
529 ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
530 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
535 OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
540 * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
541 * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
542 * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
543 * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
544 * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
546 * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
547 * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
548 * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
549 * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
550 * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
552 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
554 int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
557 int nid = NID_undef, pk_nid = NID_undef;
558 const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
561 if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
562 || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
563 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
567 if ((alg = msg->header->protectionAlg) == NULL /* unprotected message */
568 || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
569 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
573 /* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
574 X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, NULL, NULL, alg);
575 nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID);
578 /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
579 case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
580 if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
581 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CHECKING_PBM_NO_SECRET_AVAILABLE);
585 if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
587 * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
588 * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
589 * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
590 * certificate by the initiator.'
592 switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
595 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
596 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
597 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
598 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
599 if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
600 STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
601 /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
603 if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
604 /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
616 * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
619 case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
620 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
627 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), NULL, &pk_nid)
628 || pk_nid == NID_undef) {
629 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
632 /* validate sender name of received msg */
633 if (msg->header->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
634 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
635 break; /* FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
638 * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
639 * Expected name can be set explicitly or the subject of ctx->srvCert.
640 * Mitigates risk to accept misused certificate of an unauthorized
641 * entity of a trusted hierarchy.
643 if (!check_name(ctx, "sender DN field",
644 msg->header->sender->d.directoryName,
645 "expected sender", ctx->expected_sender))
647 /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
651 if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
653 } else { /* use pinned sender cert */
654 /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
655 if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
657 /* call cert_acceptable() for adding diagnostic information */
658 (void)cert_acceptable(ctx, "explicitly set", "sender cert", scrt,
660 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
661 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
670 * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
671 * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
674 * it has a valid body type
675 * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
676 * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
677 * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
678 * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
680 * If everything is fine:
681 * learns the senderNonce from the received message,
682 * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
684 * returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
686 int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
687 ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
691 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
694 if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
696 "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
698 /* validate message protection */
699 if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
700 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
701 if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
702 && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
703 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
707 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
708 if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
709 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
714 /* check CMP version number in header */
715 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
716 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
720 if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
721 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
725 /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
726 if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
727 && (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
728 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
729 msg->header->transactionID) != 0)) {
730 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
734 /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
735 if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
736 && (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
737 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
738 msg->header->recipNonce) != 0)) {
739 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
744 * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
745 * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
746 * --> Store for setting in next message
748 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, msg->header->senderNonce))
751 /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
752 if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
753 && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
757 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
758 * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
759 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
760 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
762 if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
763 0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
764 1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
770 int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)
772 if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
774 switch (msg->body->type) {
775 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
777 X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
779 if (X509_REQ_verify(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) > 0)
781 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
784 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
785 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
786 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
787 return OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir,
791 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);